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There hasbeenan evidentchangein the government'sindustrial
development policy over the past two administrations. Under the
Marcosregime, the governmentplayed a leadrole in acceleratingthe
development of industry. It provided incentivesand protection to
"infant industries," and made direct investmentsin industries.The
Aquino administration reversedthis policy with strategiesbasedon
the liberalization of markets and government regulatory functions,
althoughmany official incentivesremain. Pastpoliciesof protection
and intervention influenced the conduct and performanceof indus-
try and also had a bearing on the welfare of consumers,business
firms and government. Likewise, the current shift toward libera-
lization invites predictions on the likely changesin relativewelfare
of theseentities.
The flour milling industry is a good laboratory for examining
the relationships between the government's development policies,
corporate responseto policy, and consumerwelfare. Flour milling
is typical of many Philippine industries in that a few large firms
produce most of the market's requirements. It is a large industry
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with estimated sales of about 1_15 billion per year.1 Furthermore,
flour is one of those commodities considered by the government as
"vital," it being a substitute for rice. The pricing and supply of flour
have historically been political issues, particularly during adverse
developments in rice supply and prices. As a result, the government
has taken a special interest in the flour industry.
Government and Industry: Welfare issues
The goal of development policy for this industry is to provide
consumers with a sufficient supply of flour at the least long-run cost
through sustained investments and operations of efficient flour mills.
In practice, the implementation of measures to achieve this goal can
take on various forms. In the past, the government encouraged the
establishment of flour mills through incentives and other forms of
support. Eventually, the flour milling industry became an organized
group which effectively moderated and responded to government
policies. Later, the government became involved in more active
intervention measures, namely: regulation of entry, direct participa-
tion in import of wheat, price control, flour distribution, and import
protection.
Industry's response to government policies was conditioned
both by the external environment (being dependent on imported
wheat) and by the usual profit motives. Under this regulatory regime,
the industry decided on flour prices, aswell as on the acquisition and
allocation of wheat to the millers and on the role which flour millers
were to assume relative to the government. Up until two years
following the shift to liberalization, the structure (i.e., size and com-
position) of the flour milling industry did not change substantially.
There are welfare issues arising from the interrelationship of
development policy and firm behavior in the flour milling industry.
Public discussion hasfocused on the question of whether there is a
"flour cartel," pointing to the need for an evaluation of any adverse
consequencesfor consumer welfare of such a situation.
Summary of the Results of the Study
This article attempts to (1) identify and estimate the amount of
welfare lossesarising from past government industry policies, and (2)
1. In 1988, salesvolume was 35.2 million bags at an average selling price of 1_224 per
bag. At a reported (Asia Week, March 16, 1990) value added to 1_200 per bag by the coun-
try's 10,000 bakeries, total salesvalue of flour tO end-products is estimated at ff14.9 billion,SALDAN'A: FLOUR MILUNG INDUSTRY 91
analyze the self-interested private corporate behavior of flour millers.
Government's past policies in the industry can be described as
supportiveand "rent-seeking," typical of its overalleconomicpolicy
of import-substitution. This policy gave rise to conditions such as
border protection,= excess production (milling) capacities, price
controls and a mutual dependence between industry and govern-
ment. The results of relative welfare analysisdone in this study
indicate that a large proportion of welfare lossesin the past was
incurred by consumers.Government directly causedsomeof these
lossesthrough its profitsand inefficienciesin itswheat import mono-
poly up to 1985. Such indirect adverseeffects on welfare were
associatedwith the government'sprice controls, border protection,
regulation of entry and other policies restrictingcompetition from
domesticsuppliesand from imports.
The flour mills alsodirectly contributed to thesewelfare losses
by apparently sustainingflour pricesat levelsin excessof "normal"
returns and by operating at below-optimal scale levels. 3 Both of
these types of corporate policies would not be sustainable unless
they were adopted collectively by way of explicit or indirect coordi-
native mechanisms. In this manner, it isshown here that the hypo-
thesis of cartel-like behavior is consistentwith the adversewelfare
resultsobtained. However, it islikewiseemphasizedthat government
policy was the main reasonfor any suchcartel-like behavior of the
flour millers in the past. The corporate incentives structured by
government policies and its tolerance of apparently cartel-like
responsesby the industry made it possiblefor flour millersto reap
the benefits of governmentprotection.
The article also reviews some factors associatedwith the libera-
lization of wheat imports and the flour distribution policy of 1986.
It is argued that the consumer welfare losses(e,g., excess profits)
which persisted beyond 1986 may have precisely invited new
entrants attracted by such corporate profits. With the current libera-
lized policy of the government, the pattern emergingappearsto be
one of an industry moving toward more competition, which offers
a far better potential for reducing consumerwelfare lossesin the
future.
2. The prevention of cheaper imports from entering the country through quantitative
controls and tariffs.
3, "Normal" return is a subjective measure but comparisons are made in this study
with returns in the food industry and standard ratesof return for public investment projects.92 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT POLICY,
CORPORATE DECISIONS AND FACTORS EXTERNAL TO
THE INDUSTRY
Exp/a/n/ng Concentration in Philippine Industries
Various studieshave documented the relatively high degreeof
concentration in Philippineindustries.Highly concentrated industries
are those where a few companies account for a relatively large
proportion of resourcesand revenues of the entire industry. The
study of Patalinghug(1983) reported the high degreeof concentra-
tion in the food industry, Within the largerfood industry involving
20 categorie s, flour milling ranked seventh in terms of percentage
share in sales(62 percent) of the top three flour milling companies
relative to total industry sales. It likewise ranked high in terms of
asset concentration. Lindsey (1980) added the observationthat the
more concentrated industries tend to attract new entrants due to
their attractive profitability. Over time, he suggested that a decline
in concentrationshallensue,with a correspondingdecline in industry
profitability.
There are several explanations for a high degree of concen-
tration in Philippine industries.
Government policy increasesconcentration. In the past, the
government pursued import-substitution and rent-seeking policies,
External trade was impeded, givingriseto the approachof providing
incentives to establish "pioneer" companies in new industries,
usually supported by border-protection measures.Partly to help
ensure the viability of these companies, the government imposed
restrictions on the entry of new companies, licensing and fiscal
incentivesand restrictions to prevent "overcrowding" of industries.
These policiescreated rent and led to fewer companiesin industries
and to high concentration. The policy of "rent-seeking" is reviewed
in Ashoff (1989) and Usedhere to refer to the toleration by the
government of payments (usually by consumers) to companies
in excess of opportunity costs, in order to attract resourcesto
"develop" an industry. Such a policy guarantees above-normal
returns to companies allowed by the government to do business
in the country. It .,isin this sensethat rent-seekingis not necessarily
an undesirablepolicy. Onceestablished,evenconcentratdd industries
could attract new entrantsdueto their superiorprofitability, andthe
benefits of competition woUld set in. The problem is when new
entrants could not join the industry either by government policy
or by a cartel'simposition.SALDA_A: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 93
Concentration in some industriesalso comesabout from the
initiative of a few larger companiesfor acceleratedgrowth through
mergers and acquisition. A previous study of the present writer
(1984) showed that in banking, increased concentration resulted
from acquisitionsof larger banks, leading to increasedprofits and
further acceleratingthe internal growth of them largerbanks. Con-
centration may also arise from the operation of an industry cartel,
with limitation of output and of entry asobjectives. In both cases,
active or tacit approval by the governmentis required. In the com-
mercialbankingindustry,the governmentfavorsa policy of increased
size for "stability in the system." While the government may not
explicitly support any industry cartel, its policiesmight amount to
tacit approvalof cartel-like behaviorof companies.
Still another explanation for concentration would be external
factors like market sizeinteractingwith scaleeconomies.The domes-
tic market for some basic manufacturing may be so small as to
support only a few manufacturing plants at minimum operating
scale, e.g., steel, glass, ceramics, etc. Similarly, natural barriers
to trade work in the same direction limiting market accessand
protecting existing producers from new entrants. An article by
Monke, Pearsonand Silva-Carvalho (1987) illustrates the case of
a flour cartel in Portugal which was protected by natural trade
barrierstypical of the flour industry: hightransportation and hand-
ling costs of imports. Another example is the cement industry
wherein some plants can operate with relative monopoly power in
their market areasdue to the hightransportation costsacrossinter-
regional borders.
Public Policy and Corporate Decisions
Consumer welfare could then be influenced by public policy
and corporate decisionsin an industry. The rent-seeking policy of
governmentyielded above-normalindustry profitsfor early entrants,
at best intended by governmentto be temporary, it was in this way
that rent-seekingwasjustifiedasa developmentpolicy and commonly
adoptedfor "infant industries"in the Philippines.Corporatedecisions
are partly adaptive responsesto such policies. Even a decision to
agree on prices and output in a cartel isviable only if government
provides tacit approval. There are alsoexternal factors like market
size and economiesof scalewhich might encouragethe oligopolistic
behaviorof companies.Generally, it isto the advantageof consumers
whenever competition among companies is fostered and cartel-like
policiesareactively prevented.94 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND INDUSTRY
PERFORMANCE ON A CONSUMER WELFARE BASIS
Government policy indicators. Public policy is evaluated in
this study using indicators like border protection, domestic flour
price controls, controls in wheat supply and prices and restrictions
on capital investments and entry of new mills. Border protection
measuresinclude tariffs and duties and c.i.f, prices relative to domes-
tic prices. Border protection may exist if actual domestic flour price
exceeds flour c.i.f, price. This represents a transfer of wealth from
consumers, who have to pay prices higher than the delivered costof
imports to the flour millers or to government.
Government price controls might serveto limit price increases,
especially in the short term. However, if government also tolerates
cartel behavior, companies can limit production, and price floors
would eventually be adjusted upward. Government controls of
wheat supply and any restriction on the industry would eventually
be reflected in the averagecost of flour. The efficiency with which
government imports wheat would influence the flour millers' costs.
Any restriction on entry would potentially prevent a restructuring of
the industry towards increased efficiency and hamper competition. •
Industry indicators. The corporate performance indicators
include the rate of return, the choice of combinations of production
inputs, and the selection of measuresand enforcement mechanisms,
if any, to sustainhigh flour prices and/or the low utilization level of
plants. Some illustrations are offered, Abovemormal rates of return
can be measured by comparing actual flour industry returns relative
to (a) the average cost of flour production, inclusive of an imputed
cost for owners' capital; or (b) the average return in the food indus-
try. Voluntary underutilizaation of fixed production capacities may
be profit-maximizing if compensated for by higher prices of the
restricted output. The adverse effect on the flour miller can be
measured (in principle) by comparing •actual production costsagainst
the input costs at optimal production capacity. Any coordination by
companies of their output and plant utilization decisions would
ORStiutecartel behavior. However, it is inherently unobservable and
difficult to measure.
External factors. There are also external factors which impact
on consumer-producer welfare -- world wheat prices, c.i.f, flour
prices, etc. These external factors are used in the study to serveas
benchmarks for estimatingwelfare losses.For example, the cost of
import protection granted to domesticflour.millers can beestimated
by comparingactual domestic pricesagainst c.i.f, flour prices. Simi-SALDANA: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 95
larly, the efficiency of government wheat import operation can be
assessedby comparing actual c.i.f, import prices against world
wheat prices.
AN APPROACH FOR EVALUATING THE WELFARE
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND INDUSTRY BEHAVIOR
A Simplified Analytics for Cartel Behavior Tolerated by Government
In economictheory, perfectcompetition resultsin the maximum
level of production and the lowest flour prices, set at the average
full cost (i.e., the "social cost") of flour. In contrast,if flour millers
behaved in an oligopolistic manner after their own interest, they
could restrict production and keep prices high. No welfare loss
would be incurred under the competitive scenariowhile the oligo-
polistic approach would result in "excessprofits" for flour millers.
Following Monke et al. (1987), a diagramshowinga cartelasagainst
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The competitive equilibrium is possible when due to excess
profits of the cartel, new millersenter the industry and the average
cost (AC) curve expands to the right, as shown in Figure 1. Price
isat Pc and production quantity at Qc. In contrast,the oligopolistic
approachimpliesthe higherprice of Poand restrictedoutput, Po/Qo.
Obviously, competition means only recovery of costswhile oligo-
poly impliesa price which exceedsfull cost. The motivefor a cartel
is to secure "excess profits" by enforcing the higher price and
restrictedoutput, Qo, directly (or implicitly) on its members.If the
cartel issuccessful,the result is a transfer of wealth ("welfare loss")
from consumersto flour millers by an amount equivalent to the
shadedarea in Figure 1, bounded by the points PoABE. It is to be
noted that the industry "average cost" includesall costs,including
a reasonablereturn on capital invested. 4 The amount of this transfer
is an empirical question which isconditional on the actual demand
curve for flour and milling costs.While Figure 1 showsa relatively
elastic demand curve, the regressionof actual flour demand against
real flour prices indicatesthat Philippine flour demand isrelatively
inelastic,s i.e., consumersdo not reduce their flour consumption in
proportion to flour price increases.The implication: the cartel
policy of restricting output would be a profitable strategy if it were
enforceableby membersand allowed by government.
It shouldalso be noted that at Qo, the cartel operatesat a pro-
duction level lower than one associatedwith its minimum average
cost. Hence,anotherwelfare lossisthat due to inefficient production,
representedby the area EBCPo. Total welfare lossfrom thesetwo
sourcesisshownasthe areaPoACPo in Figure 1.6
Conditions like a small number of firms, an inelasticdemand,
restricted entries of competition and border protection serve to
attract the setting up of cartels. However, a cartel can operate only
4. It is in this sensethat the term "excess profits" is defined, i.e., returns exceeding
the reasonable return on capital invested under competitive condition_
5. The regression is in the logarithmic form: Ln Flour Sales (Bags)= Constant + Ln
Real Flour Price. The slope of the regression represents an estimate of the price elasticity.
The slope is found to be negative (--0.69), implying an inelastic demand that isstatistically
significant at the .001 level. The corresponding statistics are: R--squared = 0.65; T
(DF=12) = --4.77.
6. This is the general model for a cartel (oligopoly) with firms of similar size and
efficiency. An alternative scenario would be a cartel with a price leader and other firms as
price followers, the leader being the least cost producer. Its cost advantage would enable
it to enforce a threat tO drive prices down with its production should the other cartel
members not follow their assigned production quotas, For a time, OPEC's Saudi Arabia
operated in this manner. The Philippine flour milling industry does not fit this alternative
model as it consistsof companies of comparable size and cost efficiency.SALDANA: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 97
if government policy tolerates its existence. In particular, govern-
ment canadopt three measuresto opposethe cartel, namely:
1) exercise its regulatory powers to break up the cartel and
allow newentrants;
2) allow the entry of flour imports by reducingtariffs; and
3) imposedomesticflour pricecontrol.
The first option is a political action, similar to antitrust action
in the US. If successful,this could force the industry to the compe-
titive solution of the price-quantity pairPo, Qo - clearly the most
preferred result. The welfare loss-reducingpotential of allowing
flour imports dependson the c.i.f, price of flour. Due to hightrans-
portation and handling costs of imported flour, c.i.f, prices may
remain higher than the averagecost of the industry, and domestic
pricescan still be set in parity with imports to yield excessreturns
to millers,v Government price controls can alsoreduce welfare loss.
However, in practice, the government price control implementors
do not know the averagecost of the industry and often become a
"captive" of cartel lobby on prices. Even if price controls are
"effective," companies can respond to such policy by limiting
production, leadingto upward pressureson the price ceiling. Of the
three policies, it can be argued that allowing new entrants offers
more possibilitiesfor improvingconsumerwelfare.
Measuresof Welfare Effects
The preceding concepts of excess returns and inefficiencies
arising from any cartel behavior would be analyzed in relation to
underlying industry conditions and to government tolerance of
such behavior or involvement in industry operations. The "first-
best" flour price, equal to averagecost, shall be used asreference
point. Under their assumption,actual excessprofits per unit would
be:
ExcessProfits Equals
Actual Domestic Price LessAverageCost of Flour at Optimum
Production Capacity
7. There is also the other possibility of subsidized flour from countries like the US
and EEC, Pricesof such imports may be lessthan the cost of local flour. Strategic considera-
tions may come in, since this situation is similar to dumping exports in a local market. In
the long run, the viability of local flour millers should be protected against such practices (if
they exist).98 JOURNAL OF PHI LIP, PINE DEVELOPMENT
The key step is to decompose excessreturns into their separate
explanatory factors. From the conceptual economic model, five
potential explanatory factors could be identified, namely:
1. Due to government policy:
a) border protection;
b) inefficiencies in wheat imports; and
c) profits of NFA on wheat saleto millers;
2. Due to corporate decisions:
d) excessprivate company profits;and
e) excesscostsdue to underutilized milling capacities.
Table 1 indicates the methods for calculating each factor.
When recast in a financial accounting format, Table 1 can be seen
as Figure 2. The diagram showsthat excessreturns and costs,whether
due to government or to industry policy, are passedon to the con-
sumers by being tacked on to the minimum full cost of flour. The
relative amounts of excessreturns and costs in Figure 2 are only for
illustration, and the actual amounts are to be empirically estimated.
Figure 2: Flour Production Cost, ExcessReturns to
Industry and Costs Due to Government Intervention
ExcessReturns and Costs Price/Cost Levels
- Domestic Priceof Flour
Border Protection
CIF Flour + Tax and Duties
ExcessPrivate Return + HaJ_dling,
Actual Average Cost (at
Wheat Operations of NFA: actual production scale, using
Inefficiencies in Import NFA-purchased wheat)
Operations
Profits in Sale of Actual Average Cost (at
Wheat to Millers actual production scale, using
own*imported wheat)
Production Inefficiency
....... Estimated Average Cost (at
optimum production scale, using
own-imported wheat)
AVERAGE FULL
COST OF FLOURSALDA_A: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 99
Table 1
BREAKDOWN OF EXCESS PROFITS AND INEFFICIENCIES
Factor Computation
Govenment policy
1) Border protection (BP) BP = Import duties
2) Inefficiencies in wheat imports (WI) Wl = NFA wheat salesprice to
millers lessflour c.i.f, price
3) Profits on sale of wheat salesto PS -= NFA wheat salesprice to
millers (PS) millers lessflour cost to
NFA
industry policy
1) Excessprivate return (PR) PR -_ Ex mill flour price less
average cost using NFA-
imported wheat
2) Production inefficiency (PI) PI -= Actual average prod'n cost
lessestimated cost at full
capacity
Items (2) and (3) under government policy in Table 1 involve
the attribution Ofwelfare effectsto the entry of the National Food
Authority asthe sole importer of wheat for the flour industry. The
industry's cost curve shifts dependingon the efficiency of the wheat
import operation of NFA and its profit margins on the sale of
imported wheat to millers. The net effects are deadweightlossfor
the inefficienciesand a transfer from the flour millersto the govern-
ment for the NFA profits. In turn, the flour millers .may be con-
strained to restrict production and raise prices, thereby passingon
someof the NFA_relatedprofits and coststo the consumers.
In summary, the consumer directly bears the burden of any
excess profits of the private flour milling companies,revenuesof
the government, and of any losses incurred by (a) government
in implementing its policies, or (b) by industry in enforcing any
cartel-like restrictions in production. Identifying the amount and
relative importance of each burden on consumers,if any, over the
pre- and postderegulationperiod 1979439 isa first objectiveof this
article. A second objective is to predict future directions for the
industryfrom a policy standpoint.100 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Following is a review of the flour industry in the context of
the preceding conceptual approach.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FLOUR INDUSTRY
Government Incentives and Cooperative Allocation in the Industry's
Early Years
A previous research (Saldaffa 1989) conducted a historical
analysis of the flour milling industry from its inception right up
to 1989. This section freely draws from data and analysisin that
report and adds the dimensionof excessprofits and inefficiencies
that adverselyaffect the consumers.
The flour milling industry was established around the early
1960ss with government support through incentives,concessionary
foreign exchangerates and tax exemptions under the development
policy of "import substitution." By 1970, there were five millers
and all were allowed to freely import their wheat requirements.
In the early 1970s, the Central Bank imposed quotas on wheat
volume imports and on foreign exchange due to the scarcity of
foreign exchange. Meanwhile, the world wheat supply situation
tightened and prices increased. By that time, price control had
alreadybeensetby the government.The Organizationof flour millers,
the Philippine Association of Flour Millers (PAFMIL), lobbied for
price increasesand for governmentto assistin imports of wheat at
"affordable prices" (i.e., reducedimport dutiesand taxes).
In 1976, the Central Bank restricted the imports of nonagri-
cultural machineryand equipment in "overcrowded" industries,and
flour milling was includeddue to the low averagecapacityutilization
of the industry. Coincident with foreign exchange restrictions,
risingwheat pricesand price controls, the governmentin June 1974
decreedthe exclusive importation of wheat by the National Grains
Authority (NGA), later renamed NFA. Thus the industry shifted
from voluntary allocation of wheat amongfirms asforced by foreign
exchangeceilingsto one where a governmentagency(NGA) wasthe
sole importer and administrator of wheat import allocation. Wheat
imports under NGA were exempted from duties, taxes and other
charges.
In 1976, NGA coordinated with the flour millersin instituting
a systemof wheat allocation basedon "normal capacityutilization"
insteadof rated capacity. The wheat allocation was revisedin 1977
when the smallestflour miller, Pacific Flour Mills (PAFM), requested
8. The first flour mill, Republic Flour Mills, was built in 1958.SALDANA: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 101
an additional allocation of wheat, contending that its previous allo-
cation was less than its breakeven volume. The request was favorably
evaluated by NGA with the other flour millers. An additional wheat
allocation was given to PAFM which was deducted from the other
millers on a pro-rata basis. One can see elements of the "captive
regulator" hypothesis9 in this relationship, namely: (a) NGA struc-
tured an arrangement which ensured the viability of every member
of the industry; (b) decisions were jointly made by NGA and the
industry; (c)any later adjustments due to adverse market factors
were done coopera jvely (i.e., by agreement rather than by market
forces); and (d) t,_ PAFM case shows the government's tolerance
of cooperative behavior within the industry.
For a period of eight years (1978-85), NFA implemented the
adjusted wheat allocation system. Any deviation from the system
was based on formal agreements between the flour millers and NFA.
There was an incentive to NFA as a sole importer of wheat: the
1975 decree allowed NFA to fix the wheat grainsales price to the
millers, allowing for the possibility of "profits" to NFA for such
_sales. Since NFA did not make separate reports to the public on
any such "profits," this was a flour production cost element that
was hidden from, but fully absorbed by, the consumers. Any losses
incurred by NFA in wheat imports were also neither separately
reported nor rigorously accounted for under the government's
accounting system. Significantly, the separation in wheat imports
and flour production led to a government agency undertaking the
importing function for private industry. As a monopolist, NFA
could simply passon its costs to the flour millers. This separation
of function resulted in distorted incentives: there was no compel-
ling reason for NFA to become very efficient in its wheat import
function. 10 In subsequent years, both the PAFMIL and outside
observers (e.g., the World Bank) pointed out the inefficiencies of
NFA in wheat imports.
Liberalization: External Influences
The impact of the financial, political and economic crisis of
1983-85 was felt in the increasesin prices of both wheat and flour.
In late 1983, NFA announced plans to take over the flour distri-
bution by requiring flour millers to sell their flour output only to
9. A hypothesis in the economics of regulation which claims that over time, the regu-
lator becomes constrained to act in accordance with the interest of the regulated companies.
10, In particular, the timing of purchases of wheat is crucial due to wide changes in
world prices of wheat. Handling and losses due to undershipment at source are also serious
problems as pointed out in a World Bank (1984) report,102 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
NFA at fixed prices. In April 1984, the Marcos Cabinet approved
the return of wheat imports and flour distribution functions to
the private sector ("liberalization"). Part of the impetus for this
policy was reported to have come from the World Bank as one of
the conditions for the release of the $300 million structural adjust-
ment loan for Philippine agriculture. 11 A similar policy suggestion
was made as a concomitant measure agreed upon by the govern-
ment under the FY 1985 PL 480 Program grant from the United
States, covering the deregulation of wheat imports, flour distri-
bution and fertilizer. These liberalization measures were to (1)
open the Philippine markets to foreign suppliers of these commo-
dities, and (2)require local producers to become more efficient.
The measures are reflected in an NFA communication (shown
asAnnex 1) reaffirming the government's agreement.
In mid-1985, an Executive Order issued by President Marcos
ended NFA's wheat import function and transferred this role as
well as flour distribution to the private sector. (Prior to implemen-
tation of this order, there was an interesting episode involving an
attempt by government to effectively transfer wheat and flour
importation to a federation of bakers (PHILBAKE) by giving it a
foreign exchange allocation; After several months of protest and
adverse publicity for PHILBAKE, Marcos withdrew his order. 12)
By late 1985, liberalization had been completed and NFA re-
linguished its wheat importation role.
From 1986, NFA was relegated to the role of an interested
observer of the flour industry. For example, NFA Administrator
Emil Ong observed that flour prices remained high despite the
decline in world prices of wheat in 1985 and 1988.13 PAFMIL
responded with information on increased volumes of wheat imports
associated with NFA's turnover of this role to the private sector.
The increased visibility of the flour milling industry, combined
with continued public interest in the subject, encouraged legislative
inquiry into the industry. Senate Resolution No. 94 was passed
directing the Committee on Trade and Commerce "to inquire into
the rising prices of flour allegedly due to the existence of a cartel
among the existing eight flour millers in the country."
The findings and recommendations, shown in Committee
Report No. 235, concluded that " there appears to be a cartel,"
11. Daily Express, April 24, 1984,
12, The PHILBAKE incident is described in some detail in SaldaSa (1989).
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although the detailed basis for this finding was not specified. 14
The recommendations included (a) asking PAFMIL to "roll back
flour prices" and to "utilize their excess/idle milling capacity";
(b) the establishment of a Flour Regulatory Board with regulatory
authority over flour imports; and (c)a monitoring role for NFA
including a duty-free flour import authority should it be "esta-
blished by the Department of Agriculture that flour prices have
risen and that a flour shortage exist." These recommendations
reflect the politically sensitive nature of flour as a commodity
(i.e., requiring involvement by the Department of Agriculture) and
the lobby/influence of the bakers' group relative to PAFMI L.
The 1988 PAFMIL Annual Report includes a discussion of
capacity expansion by members and by new flour milling companies
that were to be established (SeeTable 2).
Government Policies and Cartel-like Behavior
Overall, the dominating factors in the conduct and performance
of the flour milling industry were the presenceof government inter-
vention and external circumstances - foreign exchange restrictions
Table 2
SCHEDULED EXPANSION PLANS OF EXISTING AND
NEW FLOUR MILLING COMPANIES
Expansion of FlourMills Location Est.Capacity
(MT, 275 days)
A. Existing
1. Wellington Flour Mills Manila 82,500
2. Pillsbury Mindanao Iligan City 55,000
3. General Milling Corp. Manila & Cebu n.a.
4. Universal Robina Corp. Davao n.a.
B. New Flour Mills
1. Uni-Asia Industrial Quezon Province 99,000
2. Delta Flour Mills Manila 1,100,000
3, Foremost Flour Mills Iloilo 1,100,000
4. Morning Star Manila n.a.
5. Purefoods Batangas n.a.
6. Mindanao Flour Mills Cotabato n.a.
14. Item 2 in "Findings" briefly noted that "the wheat imports of PAFMIL mem-
bersalwaysfall below industry milling capacityby 500,000 MT."104 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and economic crisis. The need for the flour millers to form an
organized front appears :to be partly a consequence of threats (and
opportunities) from government policies. The flour millers are
clearly capable of organized response to external factors and govern-
ment policies. For its part, the government appeared tolerant of such
organized response and, in fact, undertook steps supportive of what
could be called the cartel-like behavior of millers, as follows:
1) Border protection under the "import substitution" policy.
2) Allocation of incentives and privileges to an initial number
of millers who built capacities far in excess of the market
requ irements for the succeeding 10-20 years.
3) Restriction of entry and imports of machinery and equipment,
thereby creating "rent" for existing millers.
4) Allowing the cooperative allocation of wheat imports, whether
by the flour millers or through NFA.
5) Waiving import taxes and duties should adverse world wheat
markets develop (as in the early 1970s). This move insulated
local millers from adverse conditions which might have weeded
out the lessefficient producers.
6) Exercise of price control on a reactive basis rather than basing
it on estimates of the long-run marginal cost of the industry.
7) An overall policy of support for the flour industry due to the
related objective of grains price stabilization.
In the context of these government policies, the industry
organized themselves to further their own private interests by adop-
ting the following policies:
1) Joint imports or purchase of wheat from NFA.
2) Allocation of wheat imports among members to ensure the
financial viability of each PAFMIL member.
3) The carrying out of a coordinated lobby for regulated flour
prices and the enforcement of these prices among its members,
as well as for government assistance (e.g., for reduced duties
in the early 1970s when world wheat prices rose).
These are identified conditions for a "cartel" instituted through
government acquiescence and implemented by industry. At this
point it would be appropriate to define the meaning of the term
"cartel." From an economic viewpoint, in Hirshleifer (1976).
a cartel is a group of independent firms attempting, via collusive
agreement, to behave as a collective monopoly. Each firm in a
cartel agreesto produce lessthan it would under unrestrained com-
petition, the overall effect being to drive the prices up so that all
in the group will benefit. (p. 296)SALDA_A: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 105
The term "cartel" has also been usedloosely to mean companies
cooperating to keep prices up for consumers,thereby increasing
their profits. From Webster,it isdefined as
a combination of independent commercial or industrial enterprises
designed to limit competition or fix prices.
In practice, the act of "limiting competition" or "fixing prices"
is not observable. A cartel can also be noted in a positive sense.
For example, it was not uncommon to see announcements by
PAFMIL in the newspapersthat it was keepingprices low by asking
its members to follow an agreed price. Many industry associations
take pride in being able to "help the government" by their ability
to enforce agreed prices among their members. In the Philippine
context, government itself often asksindustry to "control" prices
in support of public goals, an action which, in turn, recognizes
that cartel-like enforcement of prices may be done by industry.
Finally, it is to be noted that the flour industry has many of
the features of a natural monopoly. High interborder transportation
and handling costs serve as natural protection for domestic pro-
ducers from external trade. This factor may be offset by subsidies
of flour export countries in the European Economic Council (EEC)
and the U.S. The same costsalso apply to someextent within the
regionsin the country, leadingto natural marketswhere local flour
millers stand to gain somecostadvantages.There arealsoeconomies
of scale in joint imports Of wheat, primarily through price and
handling cost advantages. The relatively small natural domestic
markets, the perishability factor and high inventory carrying costs
inhibit the setting up of large storagefacilities (silos) asa key com-
petitive strategy for a flour miller. The main weaknessof any cartel
is that it is advantageousfor any one member of the cartel to pro-
duce more than its quota. Such behavior does not seem feasible
for the flour industry. Joint imports and allocation of wheat implies
full observability (and automatic enforcement) of each member's
production. Small natural markets, high transport costs,high fixed
costs, and high inventory costsdeter a flour miller from producing
morethan its usualmarket share.In fact, the sizeof the flour millers'
local marketswas one of the guidelinesusedby NGA and PAFMIL
in alloc_ing wheat import quotas.
ANALYSIS OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE RESULTS
Some of the key industry performance indicators are prices
of imported wheat, domestic flour, and, with the intervention of106 JOURNAL OF PNILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
NFA (up to 1985), wheat. In competitive markets, a price decline
in a dominant input (wheat) would be reflected in a decline in out-
put (flour) price. If flour price does not decline at the same rate as
wheat cost, this can be interpreted as extra marketpower by
industry. A second indicator is growth in volume of wheat and
flour. The growth patterns can indicate a potential for economies
in wheat imports and flour production. New entrantsto the industry,
production capacities and capacity utilization are also reflective
of government incentives and controls, as well as of industry res-
ponseto demand. Finally, the profitability of flour millers provides
an indication of any excessreturns, particularly when related to the
broader food manufacturing industry andanalyzed overtime.
These three industry performance indicators are examined in
turn.
Price Movements
During the 1975-89 period, world wheat c.i.f, prices ranged
from a high of $204 in 1980 and a low of $118 per metric ton in
1987. However, the peso has depreciated substantially from an
averageof 1_6.77 in 1975 to ff21.70 per dollar in 1989. Annex 2
showsthe averagewholesale (ex mill) flour price, wheat c.i.f, price
and NFA wheat price to millers both at actual and constant 1988
prices (using the NCR wholesale price index), All prices are in
pesosafter adjusting for the averagecurrent peso-dollar exchange
rates (shown in Annex 6).
Annex 2 showsthat nominal prices increasedonly 2.4 times
from 1975 to 1988 for wheat but increased3.7 times for the whole-
sale price of flour over the sameperiod. The most interesting pooh:
isthe jump in flour price by 100 percent in 1984, associatedwith a
similar 100 percent.increase in NFA wheat price to millers, at a time
when wheat c.i.f, cost increased by only 37 percent. Figure 3a
presents nominal flour, NFA and world wheat prices in graphical
terms. The "margin" between flour sales price and wheat cost
prior to 1984 was smaller than after 1984.1_ However, in 1984
and againin 1986, there were marked increasesin this margin.
Figure 3b shows that on a constant 1988 price basis, wheat
and flour prices have declined but by only 53 percent for flour
relative to the 70 percent for wheat over 1975-88. The pattern of
declining real flour price did not hold for 1984 and 1986, when
real pricesincreased,asshownin Figure3b.
15. This is only a flour sales price to wheat /costmargin, rather than sales iess cost in
the usual financial statement sense.Figure 3a
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Production and Sales Volume and Capacity Utilization
The industry has grown from a wheat usage level of 515,000
MT in 1975 to 1.1 million MT by 1988, oran averageannual growth
rate of about 7 percent (seeAnnex 3). Production and salesfollowed
the same pattern, with sales growing from about 400,000 MT in
1975 to 845,000 MT in 1988. Stagnation and decline across all
activity indicators were experienced for 1983-86 as a result of the
economic crisis.
Annex 4 presents the number of millers, production capacity
levels, and utilization rates over 1975-88. The figures show the
entry of the last member of PAFMIL, Pacific Milling Corporation
in 1976. Since then, there has been an increase of only 158,000 MT
or 13 percent in production capacity for the industry. With growth
in market demand, capacity utilization increased from 46 percent in
1975 to 81 percent in 1988, except for declines in 1984 to 1986.
Figure 4 shows the capacity utilization of the industry. For 1989,
the industry estimated its capacity utilization at 91 percent. The
two largest flour millers, RFM and PFM, accounted for about 37
percentof total industry millingcapacity asof 1988.,
While it is known that these two flour millers control a large
part of industry capacity, there is no data on breakdown,of actual
flour salesby company. In this respect,the usualeconomic measures
of market concentration to reflect the degree of market power by
companiessuchasthe variousconcentrationratiosand the Hirshman-
Herfindahl index16 cannot be applied due to lack of firm-specific
flour salesdata. Most companies have many products other than
flour. Flour constitutesa smaller percentageof revenuesfor larger
firms like RFM, UniversalRobina and GeneralMilling. In any event,
low relative concentration would not have provided much informa-
tion. The cartel hypothesis in fact implies that output is allocated
among its membersto improve industry profits rather than to allow
competition for market sharesin which the more efficient firms
would dominate.
Industry Profitability
Basedon audited financial statements of sevenof eight flour
millers,the accountingreturn on averagestockholders'equity (ROE)
is calculated, shown as Annex 5.17 The industry ROE consistently
16. A comprehensive concentration index which uses all firms' data and which is
more applicable to relatively homogeneous (single-line-of-business) industries.
17_ in calculating the ROE, the appraisal increase on fixed assetswas deducted from
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increased annually from 14 percent in 1981 to 39 percent in 1988.
However, the ROEs should be interpreted with caution, again since
RFM, Robina and General Milling are diversified companies while
Wellington has substantial financial holdings. Nevertheless, analysis
shall proceed keeping such limitation in mind.
For the pre- (before 1985) and postderegulation (1985 and
later) periods, the industry experienced higher average returns after
deregulation, or 35 percent compared to 20 percent before deregula-
tion. 18 In fact, every company performed better after deregulation.
Pillsbury-Mindanao (57%), Wellington (45%), and Liberty (39%)
were the most profitable firms after the deregulation. It is to be
noted that these three companies have similar milling capacitiesand
are the leastdiversified flour millers in the industry.
Annex 5 also compares the profitability of the flour milling
industry and the overall food manufacturing industry (among the
Business Day Top 1000). The last column of the Annex shows that
the return of the flour industry exceeded that of the food industry
for all years from 1981 to 1989 - 28 percentas against 12 percent.
When segmented into the pre- and postregulation periods, t_he
comparison reveals that the average flour industry return exceeded
that of the food industry by about 12 percent for each period. In
effect, while improved economic conditions by 1986 increased the
profitability of the food sector, the flour milling companies simply
continued to show the same excessreturn compared to other food
companies. After controlling for overall industry influence, the last
column and row cell of Annex 5 shows no difference in the excess
return of the flour milling relative to the food industry, indicative
of the same substantial market power of the flour milling companies
even after deregulation. The intended benefits of deregulation -
bringing flour prices down and keeping flour millers' profits in line
with the food industry's - were not yet evident up to three years
after deregulation. An explanation shall be offered for this phenome-
non after an analysis of the components of these excess returns at
the end of this article.
ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NFA INTER-
VENTION IN WHEAT IMPORTS
The costs and benefits of the NFA wheat import scheme can be
cast in the analytic diagram shown as Figure 5. The study's findings
18, One-way analysis of variance analysis indicates significant difference in ROE
between 1981-84 and 1985-88 for the pooled sample of all firms for aHyears (at the 0,001
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Figure5
EFFECTS OF NFA INTERVENTION IN
WHEAT IMPORTS
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justify the representation of an upward shift in the flour industry's
cost curves, ACg and MCg, in Figure 5. The immediate results are
decreased production, from Qo to Qg, and increased prices, from Po
to Pg. After considering NFA's added cost and the price-quantity
adjustments, the industry's excess return isthe new area bounded by
PgRST in Figure 5.
The added cost to the industry due to NFA intervention corres-
ponds to the area bounded by TSBE which consists of (a) profits of
NFA on wheat trade, and (b) NFA's own inefficiencies in its wheat
imports. Only the first item is a wealth transfer from industry to
government. Item (b) is a deadweight loss,an argument for liberaliza-
tion of the wheat trade. This analysis then presents several questions
as follows:
1) Did NFA's intervention increase, or decrease, the overall
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2) If it increasedcosts,how muchof it wasdue to -
a) Profits?
b) Inefficiency?
The answerto the first questionisalreadyevidentin Figures3a
and 3b. NFA's sale pricesof wheat to millerssubstantiallyexceeded
wheat c.i.f, costsin all yearsexcept 1980 and 1981. The declinesin
real wheat cost in 1976-78 and 1983 were not followed by similar
ratesof declinein NFA's wheat sellingprices.What isquite surprising
is that the decline in real terms of wheat costsin 1984 coincided
with a substantial increase in wheat price to millers.This indicates
that NFA might have generated substantialmarginsfrom its wheat
operations. Further, someof its price increases were not justified by
correspondingincreases in generalpricelevels.
The secondquestion iswhether suchpotential marginsfor NFA
were converted to "profits" (i.e., transfers from millers to the
national budget) or whether they were lost as transaction costs.
Annex 6 shows some results. The dollar value of wheat imports
(column 1) was convertedto local currency usingthe averagepeso-
dollar exchangerate (column 2). The figure so derived (column 4)
becomesthe estimated cost to NFA of imported wheat. The selling
price of wheat to millers (column 5) is compared to the cost of
wheat to NFA in column 4. This providesanestimate of grossprofit
per MT to NFA. When multiplied by the actual tonsof wheat soldto
millers, an estimate of the averagetotal amount of profits that
shouldhave been generatedby NFA ismade(column 8) asfollows:
(Total Wheat Salesin Pesosto Millers) less(Estimated
Total Wheat Costin Pesosto NFA) Equals'Estimated
GrossProfit of NFA
This estimated grossprofit can then be either realizedor lost
possiblydue to inefficiency:
Estimated Potential Gross Realized GrossProfit +
Profit of NFA = Other Costsof NFA
One measureof realizedNFA grossprofit isthe reported profits
of NFA per its accountingsystem.This isshown ascolumn 9. The
estimate of "other costs" is potential grossprofit (column 8) less
reported NFA grossprofit. The resultsindicate that NFA's realized
profits were lowest in 1975 and 1980 P97 million and_48 million,
respectively) and highest in 1984 at _583 million. An interesting
finding concernsthe estimate of "other costs." Data show the least
"other cost" occurring in 1975, 1979 and 1980 but registeringa
highof P1.05 billion in 1984 and_704 million in 1985. On average,114 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
estimated NFA lossesamount to lJ306 million per year, or about 56
percent of its potential surplus from wheat operations. These esti-
mates of costs due to unexplained "other costs" appear substantial
and in agreement with a finding by World Bank (1984) that "since
NFA gained monopoly control on importing wheat, domestic prices
to the millers have been on average about 32 percent higher than
border prices implying an implicit tariff that is higher than private
importing with a tariff of 20 percent."
NFA's intervention was associated with excessburden ta flour
consumers and producers, e.g., up to t_1.6 billion in 1984. While part
of this amountrepresents government revenues, a large component
was due to outright lossesdirectly borne by flour consumers and
millers. Moreover, this burden is not similar to tariff as cited in the
World Bank report becauseof its nontransparent nature.
ESTIMATING THE COST OF BORDER PROTECTION
Historical flour imports have been marginal, reaching their
highestlevel in 1986 at about 13 percentof domesticsales,While the
governmenthasimposedtariffs on flour imports, the levelscould not
be consideredas prohibitive, set at 30 percentfor most of the 1975-
88 period under review. Annex 7 presentsflour import data in rela-
tion to domestic salesand prices. The relevant period to look at is
1985_8 when substantial flour imports entered the country. This
also coincideswith the profitable years of the industry. C.i.f. values
for imports during the period of 1985-88 range from 40 to 50
percentof domesticex mill prices.Evenwith the tariff and estimated
(6%) handling costs, imports costonly an averageof 76 percent of
ex mill flour price during the same period. Sinceeventually all flour
(whether domestic or imports) must sell at the goingwholesale (ex
mill) price, the difference of 24 percent must be the estimated
margin of the flour importer. Some qualifications may be made
regardingthe foregoingestimates:
a) Handling and distribution costsfor flour may be higher
than 5 percentfor the importer,
b) Imported flour even underthe "bread flour" category may
include the lower quality variety which is sold at lower
prices.
Both possibilitieswould reduce the actual profits of the ira-
porter. Therecould also be other barriers to free imports of flour,
particularly in the distribution aspect and in the linkage to flour
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assureregular supply. In this industry, the government's tariff policy
appears to have restricted imports to an average of 2 percent of the
domestic flour market. Tariff constitutes the additional cost to the
consumer due to border protection.
ESTIMATING EXCESS RETURNS AND PRODUCTION
INEFFICIENCY: FLOUR MILLERS
The study estimatesexcessreturns and production costeffects
of apparent production decisionsand policies by flour millers based
on audited company financial statements.A better alternative would
have been to use detailed costestimatesby the flour millersthem-
selves,but thesewere not available.
Three companiesof identical capacitiesare assumedtypical of
flour milling operations, namely: Pillsbury-Mindanao, Liberty and
Wellington. Of the three, only Pillsbury-Mindanaohad mainly flour
milling operations, making possiblethe analysisof itsfinancial state-
ments as a single line-of-businessreport. Liberty hasother linesof
related business(livestock,groceries)while Wellingtonisa joint flour
milling and investment corporation. In estimatesof costsand returns
on flour milling, it is necessaryto: (a) allocate costsand revenues,
and (b) apportion the owner's equity capital acrosslinesof business.
While the allocation processmay be arbitrary, it provides a first
approximation of excessreturnsand costs.
From Pillsbury-Mindanao's financial statements cost of sales
information, "social costof production" isestimated:
SocialCost = Cost of Production (Net of depreciation)at full
production capacity
+ Sellingand Administration Cost
+ Other Expenses(Income)
+ Social Rate of Return (15% of AverageStock-
holders'Equity)
The cost of production for Pillsbury-Mindanao excludes
"management fees" and "technical assistancefees" paid by the
company to related companies. Theseitems are considered aspart of
the returns to owners. Depreciation was excluded and, in lieu, a
social rate of return was added. The 15 percent rate is the usual rate
set by NEDA in appraising development projects. Stockholder's
equity includes only contributed capital and retained earnings.19 In
19. Revaluation capital, which is a book adjustment to reflect current value of fixed
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effect, the "social cost" is defined asthe minimal costof producing,
selling and financing the production of flour with returns set at the
maximum that is acceptable to society. It is calculated for full pro-
duction capacity per year (300 days) and assumesthat all costs vary
with production except selling and administrative costs. To estimate
the potential production inefficiency resulting from any restriction
of output the production cost at full capacity is compared to cost
at actual production level. In effect, the difference is the additional
cost due to production below full capacity.
The results, assuming that Pillsbury-Mindanao represents the
cost structure of the-typical flour mill, isshown in Annex 8.
The estimated excess profits can be diVided into pre-1984 and
post-1984. Up to 1984, the excess profits of Pillsbury-Mindanao
did not exceed1_10per bag or 10 percent of flour selling price. How-
ever, beginning 1984, estimated excessprofits increased to t_21 per
bag in 1985, and tb96 per bag in 1986 or 11 percentand 42 percent
of selling price, respectively. Again, it should be recalled that the
excess profits estimate includes "management fees" and "technical
assistance fees" paid by the company to its related interest. To the
extent that such fees were payments for the minimum required
management inputs, the estimates of excessprofit are overs_tared. 2o
The estimated cost of curtailed production appearsto besmall,
from 3 percent of the selling price in 1983 to 7 percent in 1986.
Since plant costs considered are not included as "fixed," these esti-
mates may be understated. This excesscost element hasdecreased in
the lastthree years (1986-88) due to increasing plant utilization asso-
ciated with increased consumer demand.
The results for the comparison case(Liberty Flour Mill) shown
as Annex 9 follow a pattern similar to that of Pillsbury-Mindanao. 21
There were also higher excessprofits for Liberty during the postdere-
gulation period. Estimates of excess profits for Liberty did not
exceed 6 percent in 1985 compared to as high as 12 percent after
1985. The cost of curtailed production also reached its highest level
in 1986, about 10 percent, and declined after that year as market
demand expanded. A difference in Liberty's data lies in the non-
separability of management/technical compensation from its other
operating expenses.
20. Hence, there is some basis for considering these fees as excess profits since they
increase or decrease with the profits of the company Over time, indicating the discretionary
and ownership nature of the payments.
21. For Liberty, an allocation of costs, revenues, and equity had to be done across
the company's major product categories. Flour constituted about 80-90 percent of the
company's costs of production per audited statements and the allocation method was based
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary Results
Focusing on the case of Pillsbury-Mindanao as a surrogate for
the flour industry, and initially on the year 1984, the impact of
industry conditions and government intervention on consumer
welfare is illustrated in Figure 6.22 Insofar as corporate/industry
decisions are concerned, the impact of excess profits amounted to 8
percent while the curtailment of production increased costs by 3.7
percent, both of average ex mill flour price. These are added costs to
consumers, all together accounting for about 12 percent of the ex
mill flour price. Excess profits are a transfer of wealth from consu-
mers to flour millers, while higher costs due to reduced output are a
loss to consumers but not a gain to the producers either (i .e., a dead-
weight loss). Government policy, as reflected in the 1984 reported
profits of NFA of 22 percent of ex mill flour price, constituted a
wealth transfer from consumers to government. The estimated ineffi-
ciencies of NFA placed at 75 percent of the ex mill price for 1984
which were not accounted for in the transactions (see Annex 6) are a
potentially important loss to consumers. The net result to the con-
sumer in 1984 of adverse industry conditions and government inter-
vention in 1984 was flour that cost them t_185 instead oft=122 per
bag. From a first-best perspective, ex mill flour prices could have
been 28 percent lower in that year. This estimate does not even
include any hidden NFA inefficiencies. The welfare loss in 1984 was
the total amount of "extra" t_63 shouldered by consumers which
was split t_41 (65 percent) to government and P22 (35 percent) to
industry. During that year, the government generated its biggest
profits, more than those realized by flour millers.
Figure 7 has been derived from Annex 8 to conduct the same
type of analysis for the entire period 1979-88 using the surrogate
case of Pillsbury_Mindanao. Up until 1983, excess industry profits,
excess factory costs and NFA profits were all relatively small. During
this period, NFA partook of the larger part of the excess profits. In
1984, there was an abrupt increase in flour prices, and NFA received
most of the excess returns. After deregulation, production costs went
down (with lower wheat prices) and flour prices increased slightly.
NFA's profits disappeared entirely and all excess profits were cap-
tured by the flour millers. The effect of deregulation at least within
22, All figures are based on Table 2.Figure 6
SUMMARY OF EXCESS PROFITS, EFFECTS OF CURTAILED
PRODUCTION AND COST OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
(Per bag of flour, 1984)
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three years of its implementation, was a transfer of wealth from
government(NFA profits) to the flour millers.
In Figure 7, it appearsthat all gainsfrom deregulation were
captured by the flour millersand not by consumers.Becauseof the
structure of the industry, the withdrawal of government from the
marketplace did not reduce flour prices. That the flour price in-
creasedwhen there wasa contemporaneousdecline in wheat coststo
the flour millers during postderegulationfurther underscored the
plight of the consumer. By that time, the government had lost the
ability to immediately remedy the situation.
In free markets,the prospectof large profits attracts imports
and new entrants. The soundnessof the government's policy of
liberalization is evident in the highest imports recorded from 1.986
to 1988 (seeAnnex 7). However, due to the 30 percent tariff and
high costof financing and handling, imports had a limited effect on
local flour prices, More significantly, liberalizationallowed the entry
of new flour millers who very likely noticed the high industry
profits in 1986-88 and decidedto investrightaway. But considering
the longsetup periodfor suchcapital-intensiveprojects,theseinvest-
mentsin newflour millstook sometime to becomefully operational.
Meanwhile, during sucha period of "adjustment," incumbent firms
earnedabove-normalprofits.
CONCLUSIONS
The usualcaveats should be made about data limitations and
the estimation proceduresusedin this study. The conceptualmodel
proposed here was designed to assessthe general magnitudesof:
(a) excessindustry profits; (b) inefficienciesby industry and govern-
ment; and (c) "profits" of government.All of thesefactors represent
excesscoststo consumers,or a declinein their welfare.
The objective of this article is to determine any possiblecon-
sequencesof the pastindustry structureand of governmentpolicies,
rather than to determine whether a "flour cartel" existed. Neverthe-
less,the observationof systematicadverseeffects on consumer wel-
fare is consistentwith the results achievable by a cartel. Certain
observable patterns of cooperation, low production capacities and
past industry pronouncements shown here can be considered as
"cartel-like" in nature. In like manner,direct intervention by govern-
ment in wheat imports need not be adverseto consumer interest.
Unfortunately, governmentintervention resulted in "profits" at the
expense of consumers.There are several qualitative dimensionsto
the issueworth mentioningasfinal remarks.SALDANA: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 121
First, the entry of the government in imports of wheat did not
reduce the welfare loss to the consumers. In effect the government
performed as a "purchasing department" of the flour millers, albeit
an inefficient one. The flour millers largely passed on the costs of
government's direct involvement in wheat imports to the consumers.
Similarly, the subsequent exit of government did not immediately
diminish the excessprofit position enjoyed by the flour millers.The
adjustment process in terms of entry for new firms took time_and
the incumbent flour millers meanwhile reaped above-normal profits.
Second, it was government's acquiescence that enabled the
flour millers to select policies which gradually brought about a
"cartel-like" situation. Of special importance were the government's
policies allowing joint wheat imports, cooperative allocation of
imported wheat, disallowing expansion through a ban on new plant
and equipment imports, and price controls operated with little know-
ledge-baseconcerning flour production and distribution costs. It also
highlights the weakness of a price-regulation approach whereby the
regulator is dependent on the industry for vital cost information. ,,
Third, it should be noted that "profits" by NFA were plowed
back for government use,e.g., for financing its rice price stabiliza-
tion program. In this sense, NFA's "profits" should be called a
surplus to differentiate it from the profits of flour millers. Having
made that point, the negative aspects of NFA's intervention were
shown to have far outweighed the good aspects. NFA's surplus
placed it in an ambiguous position, one that is not conducive to
correct behavior. For instance, should NFA have "maximized" its
surplus? That would have been a policy decision harmful to consu-
mers. Or should it have "minimized" its surplus? That would have
amounted to a policy of "promoting" the consumption of imported
flour over that of local rice farmers' output. It is this senseof ambi-
guity that made (and continues to make) government inherently
incapable of undertaking intervention in the flour industry. The
losses of NFA due to inefficiency were a further negative aspect.
Unlike a tax, such implicit costs were not visible to consumers and
to industry, It follows that the public cannot monitor and control
its own government instrumentality in that regard. These are import-
ant arguments in favor of liberalization.
Fourth, and more positive, the remedies to the problems iden-
tified in the study are self_vident. Sincegovernment was instrumen-
tal in setting the cartel-likecondition in the industry, its hand would
likewise be crucial in reversing that condition. One set of policy
ontions is to "break up" the industry using legislation similar to anti-
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"who enter into agreement . . . or take part in combination in the
form of trust in restraint of trade or. prevent free competition. ''23 A
recent industry position paper by the Philippine Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry suggested that existing legislation on anti-
collusion be strengthened, probably in terms of its tenor and en-
forcement. However, such a regulatory approach calls attention
to the fact that many Philippine industries also consist of only a few
firms. An alternative set of policy options would involve allowing
(1) the entw of new flour millers, (2) the expansion of existing ones,
and (3) flour imports. However, there are also penalties under this
approach, in terms of possible instability in prices or bankruptcies
of flour millers. Between the two options, the latter would at least
permit the penalties to be borne directly by the private sector, the
group which must make the consumption and production choices.
Such a situation should be far more conducive to correct choices by
consumersand flour millers.
Finally, one can readily predict the possible consequences of
deregulation in the flour milling industry. Given the exceptionally
profitable years 1984_7, many new companies recognized the excess
profits being generated and entered the industry. Such capacity
decisionsshould be reflected in the additional production of flour by
1990 onwards. In that case,PAFM ILwould face sometough choices.
The restriction of output dependedcrucially on governmentacquie-
scence on the nonentry of competition and price adjustments
(although under "price control"). With deregulation, PAFMIL can-
not take in many new memberssincethat would meanabsorptionby
existing membersof the resultingcostsof curtailed production, with
little prospectsof upward adjustment in prices.However,the econo-
mies of importing wheat shall continue to be a main rationale for
continued "cartelization" of the industry. Since none of the new
entrants is large enoughto dominate the industry, prospectsare for
the formation of a new wheat import group outsidePAFMIL. Com-
petition can be expected between these two (or more) large flour
milling groups. From a consumer welfare viewpoint, competition
betweentwo "cartelized" groups maynot necessarilyleadto a "first
best" scenario, but is probably still better than the situation which
prevailedduringthe period studiedin thisarticle.
23. RA 1956, "An Act Amending Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code Concerning
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Annex 1: Policy Measures Included asConditionalities in Grant by the US









We refer to your 1st Indorsement dated 23 April 1985 concerning NFA's
request to avail of the US PL480 Title I facility.
PROPOSED SELF-HELP MEASURES
The USAID may wish to consider as self-help measures, the general policy
measures and guidelines incorporated in NFA's Development Thrusts and Stra-
tegies for 1985 to 1989, among which:
1) NFA's stabilization function to focus on rice, corn and wheat
2) The level of market intervention for the purpose of stabilization to
be set on the basis of operational and financial efficiency and
effectiveness
3) NFA's role in commodities other than rice, corn and wheat to center
on market development rather than actual involvement in marketing
activities
4) Development of a responsive and responsible private sector as the
main concern in terms of facility development
5) Assessment of programs/project and facility development to be
assessed on the basis of NFA's main mission of stabilization and on
economic viability
It will be recalled that these policy guidelines are the same guidelines
recommended by the ADB in the Organization and Systems Study for NPA, and
to which the World Bank has expressed concurrence. It is also on the basisof
these policy guidelines that NFA has agreed to the following more specific
policy changes:
1) Deregulation of rice price in October
2) Opening up of wheat importation to the private sector, subject to
NFA's supervision by way of prior licensing and approval of import
permit
3) Opening up of flour distribution to the private sector
4) Eventual subsidiarization or privatization of Kadlwa operations,
depending on the outcome of the study which the ADB, in principle,
has agreed to sponsorunder a separate Technical Assistance Grant.124 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Annex 1 (Continued)
UTILIZATION OF LOCAL CURRENCY PROCEEDS
Asto the salesproceeds, we proposeto usethesein strengthening the post-
harvestcapability of small farmers.The most pressingneedsof smallfarmers
are on-farm storageand drying facilities which the farmers themselvescan
manage andoperateandcommunalirrigationsystems.












Atavera|le actualprices constant prices (bess year=1988)
Flour NFA Wholesale Flour NFA
wholesaleWheat price Wheat price wholesaleWheat price Wheat
Year price tomillers c.i.f,cost index price tomillers ¢.i,f.cost
(P/bag) (P/bag) (P/bag) (1988=100)(P/bag) (P/bag) (P/bag)
1975 57.75 42.50 33.23 12,8 452.53 333.03 260.38
1976 63.65 42.22 32.87 15.2 419.83 278A7 216.80
1977 63.53 42.01 25.73 16.2 392.60 259.60 159.01
1978 64.97 41.99 28.05 17.0 381.83 246.76 164.83
.1979 73.19 42.97 33.53 19.8 370.17 217.34 169.59
1980 77.77 47.14 42.28 22.7 343.13 207.98 186.54
1981 86.62 51.64 43.08 26.5 327.00 195.18 162.82
1982 89,17 51.67 39.11 .30.4 293.73 170.23 128.83
1983 93.70 56.42 39.03 35.3 265.77 160.04 110.71
1984 185.00 113,72 53.58 60.8 304.29 187.05 88.13
1985 192.31 105.46 73.69 77.9 246.82 135.36 94.58
1986 224.68 n.a. 71.48 79.3 283.41 n.a. 90.17
1987 211,76 n.a. 68,56 85.4 248.06 n.a. 80.31
1988 213.05 n.a. 80.74 100,0 213.05 n.a. 80.74
1989 236.81 n.a. 111.88 110.6 214.11 n.a. 101.16
Sources: National FoodAuthority; PAFMIL.SALDANA: FLOUR MILLING INDUSTRY 126
Annex 3
Production and Sales Volume: Wheat and Flour
Domestic Production, Sales and Imports
(1975-88)
Wheat Domestic flour (m.t.) Imported flour
usage Growth Growth
Year m.t.1 rate Production Sales rate (%) m.t. Growth
(%) rate (%)
1975 515,459 392,661 398,006
1976 617X)53 19.71 470,062 462,722 16.26
1977 699 _944 13A3 533,196 532,169 15.01
1978 732 832 4.70 558,249 562,266 6.65'
1979 774 569 5.70 590,043 581,799 3.48
1980 768 988 -0.72 584,106 586,432 030
1981 748.238 -2-57 626_706 632,573 7.87 15,150
1982 936.287 24.83 689,195 686,477 8.52 13,402 -11.54
1983 912019 -2A9 691_942 693,770 1.06 10,770 -19.64
1984 740920 -18.76 564A21 551,183 -20.55 8,775 -18.52
1985 689 387 -6.96 523,069 537,375 -2.51 27,292 211.02
1986 759285 10.14 575_35 577_92 7.54 92,1'24 237_55
1987 959 342 26.35 718_524 729,549 26.24 46,231 -49.82
1988 1,105,993 15.29 831,238 844,456 15.75 57,907 25.26
Average:
1975-88 782_80 632 596,374 598,333 6.65
1976_0 684307 8.56 521,384 520,564 8.24
1981-85 805,370 _1.19 619,067 620,276 -1.12 18,078 40.33
1986-88 941 _40 17.26 708_532 717,299 16.51 65,421 71.00
11975-78 was estimated based on historical wheat: flour ratio.
Sources: National Food Authority; PAFMI L.126 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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Production Capacity and Utilization





Year of (MT,275 work- utilization
millers ingdays) (percent).
1975 7 1,015,047 46.55
1976 8 1_96,058 51.61
1977 8 1,096,058 58.54
1978 8 1,096,058 61.29
1979 8 1,096,058 64.78
1980 8 1,096,058 64.31
1981 8 1,096,058 62.66
1982 8 1,096,058 78.22
1983 8 1,096,058 76.27
1984 8 1,096,058 61.97
1985 8 1,096.058 57.66
1986 8 1,208,533 57.59
1987 8 1,298,633 72.77
1988 8 1,240,800 81.71
1989 8 1,241,600 91.00
B. By Individual flour miller (asof 1988):
m.t. 25 kg.bags
1. Republic Flour Mills 270,000 10,900,000
2. Liberty 164,600 6,584,000
3. Wellington 164,600 6,584,000
4. Pillsbury-Mindanao 164,600 6,584,000
5. Universal Robina 137,600 5,504,000
6. General Milling 129,600 6,184,000
7. Philippine Flour Milling 129,600 5,184,000
8. Pacific Flour Milling 81,000 3,240,000
Tota I 1,241,600 49,664,000
IJr_
Sources:NationalFoodAuthority (NFA); PAFMIL.Annex 5
Return on AverageStockholder's Equity (Percent)




Floor industry I Food Excess return "
Year RFM Liberty Welling Pills Pacific Robins Milling mfg.2 offloor over -n
Mean S.D, food mft9. 0
C
_)
1981 10_ 18.8 17.1 16.7 8_ n.a. n.a. 14"3 4.1 9.5 4.8
1982 123 23.fi 11.1 21.8 5.1 n.a. n.a. 14"9 6.9 5"3 9.6 r r
1983 13.5 34.4 31.4 32_ 9.4 n.a. n.a. 24.2 10.5 8.1 16.1
1984 12.9 43.2 42"9 29.8 10.3 n.a. n.a. 273 14.2 11.6 16.2 C_
1985 12.2 28.7 31.2 51"9 13.6 12.3 n.a. 25.0 14.3 n.a. n.a.
1986 18_ 43;0 52.5 54.2 24.3 29_ n.a. 37.0 13.8 23.7 13.3 0
t987 19.9 45.8 54.1 69.0 263 28.8 n.a. 40.7 17.2 28.9' 11.8 r.nC
1988 53.0 373 405 51.1 27.6 n.a. 22.1 38.7 11.2 27.6 11.1
1989 31.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -<
SUMMARY:
1981-1989:
Mean 20.6 34.4 35.1 403 15.7 23.6 22.1 27.6 11.5 16.4 11.8
S.D 13.0 9.3 14.5 17.1 8.6 8_) n.a. 9.6 4.0 9.2 3.7
1981-1984:
Mean 12.5 30_ 25.6 25.1 8.2 n.a. n.a. 20.3 8.9 8.6 11.7
s.d 1.0 9.5 12.4 8.1 2.0 n.a. n.a. 5.9 3.8 2.3 4.8
1985-1988:
Mean 253 38.8 44.5 56.5 23.1 23.6 22.1 35.3 14.1 26.7 12.1
s.d 16.0 6.5 9.3 7.3 5.6 8_) 6.1 2.1 2.2 0.9
ExcessReturn Due to Deregulation (1985-88 less1981-B4):
Mean 13.3 8.8: 18.9 31.4 14.9 n.a. n.a. 15.1 5.2 0.43
Sources:1.AuditedFinancialStatements ofCompanies.
2.Business DayTop 1000Corporations,
3. Excess returnduetoderegulet'_on aftercontrollingfor foodindustryinfluence.o_
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Varueof Average PHo velueofImporte Sales to Grou profit Actualm.t. ]Estimated Reported Estimmtldcostof
Yam' wheat pesos to mglerJ perm.t. of ofwheat gross profit grossprofit NFA inefficiency
|mportl USdotter average wheatsa|m sahllto of NFA ofNFA
(_l.f,) rote Tolml Iq_m/m.t. prlae/m,t, to millers millers wkut elm (P000} (P000) Percent
($) (P000) of torsi
(1) (2) [3t (4) _6} (el (7) (8) (0) 4T0} (11)
1975 89,652,137 6.77 606,944,967 1,329,15 1,700.00 370.85 448,753 185,422 97,422 68,980 41.4
1976 129,135,748 7.23 933,651,466 1,314.72 t,686.72 374.00 734,060 274,535 81,750 192,785 •70.2
1977 86,171,875 7A7 636,233,806 1,0292.2 1,6802.8 651.06 627,288 406,391 183,999 224,392 54.9 • c
1978 113,683,909 7.44 645,808,283 1,121.89 1,679A7 557.58 695,697 387,907 170,172 217,735 56.1 :::o z
1979 155,745,985 7.39 1,150,962,829 1,341.25 1,718.86 377.51 908,25t 342,966 281,682 6,1,284 17.9 _>
1980 175,584,687 7.40 1,299,325,684 1,691.18 1,885,54 194.36 751,841 146,125 48,314 97,811 66.9 r
1981 189,918,295 7.51 1,426,286,35 1,723.18 2,068.76 342.68 856,195 293,315 134,380 158,935 54.2 0 "11
1982 170,781,465 7.86 1,412,846,435 1_564.30 2,056.93 502.63 894,892 449,799 264,634 185,165 41.2 10
1983 148,471,640 8.48 1,259,038,859 1,561.22 2,258.99 695.77 861,623 599A94 198,402 401,092 66.9
1984 153,98t,854 10.99 1,692,280,575 2,143.29 4218,51 2,075.22 787,524 1,634,287 583,220 1,051,067 64.3 r- "10
1985 116,982,407 16.70 1,953,606,197 2,947.71 4,548.77 1,601.08 570,466 913,348 209,322 704,026 77.1 __.
z
Annual Average 510,599 204,847 305,752 5516 m
rn







Flour Import Quantity and Prices _> r-
(1975-88 ) z-_1
Flourimportprice "'
Imported tmportedflour aspercentof to ex mill -n t-
Average Total value price per bag price/bag 0
Year Quantity Percent of pesos to (pesos) (pesos) (in percent) C -n
(bags) domestic USdollar _:




1975 385,605 2 6.77 18,410,521 22,059,943 47.74 57.21 83 99 122 C
o_
1976 153,925 1 7.23 3_293,843 5,122,195 21.40 33.28 34 52 120
_0
1977 157,828 1 7.47 3,649,170 5,7.98,909 23.t 2 36.74 36 58 96 <
1978 18,154 a 7.44 513,933 645,822 28.31 35.57 44 55 91
1979 240,710 1 7.39 10,053,289 10,768,575 41.77 44.74 57 61 102
1980 - - 7A0 .......
1981 1,238 a 7.51 75,370 163,200 60.88 131.82 70 152 254
1982 1,439 a 7.86 117,476 254,695 81.64 177.00 92 198 330
1983 6,208 a 8,48 493,316 1,460,536 79.47 235.28 85 251 418
1984 202,480 1 10.99 18,691,286 19,849,863 92.31 98.03 50 53 88
1985 789,980 4 16.70 58,476,286 71,433, t 31 74.02 90.42 38 47 78
1986 3,098,493 13 18.74 285,831,325 352,891,778 92.25 113.89 41 51 74
1987 1,186,197 4 20.40 84,371,442 105,383,483 71.13 88.84 34 42 70
1988 1,395,451 4 21.02 114,559,210 144,460,791 82.09 103.52 39 49 81
Average 587,5 t6 2 46,041,267 56,945,609 61.24 95.87 54 90 148
Source: Centrat Bank (Import Quantity and Value); NFA (Domestic Sales and Prices). to"=
aLess than one percent, ¢D..t
Annex 8
Estimated Excess Profits and
Cost of Curtailed Production Level:
The Caseof Pillsbury-Mindanao Flour Milling Co,
(1979-88)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Pesos per bag
Ave. Wholesale Price of Flour/25Kg Bag 73.19 77.77 86.52 89.17 93.70 185.00 192.31 224.68 211.76 213.05
Actual Cost of Production 67.57 71.07 85.43 82.69 84.29 170.46 171.06 129.06 145.10 156.08
Excess Profi't at Actual Capacity 7.62 6.70 1.09 6.48 9,41 14.54 21.25 95.62 66.66 56,97
Fixed Cost Per Bag at Actual Capacity 6.44 7.55 8.33 6.40 6.34 1.0.95 11.77 26.52 20.24 21.13
Fixed Cost Per Bag at Full Capacity 2.75 3.55 3.94 3.18 3.52 4.11 5.38 9,89 9.69 12.18 c _
Cost of Curtailed Production Leveks 3.68 4.00 4.39 3.22 2.82 6.84 6.40 16.63 10.65 8.95 z:_
r"
Percent of flour salesprice per bag o
"R
Actual Cost to Sales Price 89.59 91.39 98.75 92.74 89.95 • 92.14 88.95 57.44 68.52 73.26 -_ z
Excess Profit to Sales Price 10.41 8.61 1.25 7.26 10.05 7.86 11.05 42,56 31,48 26.74 F
Cost of Curtailed Production Levets 5.03 5.15 5.08 3.61 3.01 3.70 3.33 7AO 5.03 4.20 ._ m
Z
m
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Estimated ExcessProfits and :zL
}>
Cost of Curtailed Production Level: ""
-n





1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 t-
C_
Pesosper bag -_ o
Ave. wholesale price of flour/25Kg bag 77.77 86.52 89.17 93.70 185.00 192.31 224.68 211.76 213.05 o_c
Actual cost of production 70.56 82.82 83.84 81.32 157.34 n.a. 171.59 160.49 n_. _o
-<
Excess profit at actual capacity • 7.21 3.70 5.33 12.38 27.66 n.a. 53.09 51.27 n.a.
Fixed cost per bag at actual capacity 5.43 7.57 6.21 8.15 16.35 18.63 37.66 37.29 29.58
Fixed cost per bag at fufl capacity 2.22 2.70 3.t4 4.51 7.10 7.88 15.67 18.94 18.52
Cost of curtailed production levels 3,21 4,88 3,07 3.64 9,26 10,76 21,98 18,35 1t ,06
Percent of flour sales price per bag
Actual cost to sales price 90,73 95.72 94,02 86,79 86,05 n,a, 76,37 75,79 n,a,
Excess profit to sales price 3,15 3,25 3,75 5,54 4.51 n,a. 9.13 11.80 n,a,
Cost of curtailed production levels 4,13 5,64 3.44 3,88 5,00 5,59 9,7.8 8.67 5.19
Source of basic informatLon: Audited financial statements of Liberty Flour Milling Co.; NFA (for average ex mil_ prices of flour).
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